Voting on Restricted Preference Domains: A Survey


Edith Elkind


Balliol College
University of Oxford
Department of Computer Science
Room 413, Wolfson Building
Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3QD
United Kingdom


Monday, 11 December 2017, 10:00 to 11:00


  • A-201 (STCS Seminar Room)


Arrow's famous impossibility theorem (1951) states that there is no perfect voting rule: for three or more candidates, no voting rule can satisfy a small set of very appealing axioms. However, this is no longer the case if we assume that voters' preferences satisfy certain restrictions, such as being single-peaked or single-crossing. In this talk, we discuss single-peaked and single-crossing elections, as well as some other closely related restricted preference domains, and provide an overview of recent algorithmic results for these domains.